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Abstract
Lotteries are traditional instruments for fundraising in general. Morgan (2000) has shown
that they can also be very effective in the provision of a public good. However, a fair lottery
can only enhance provision but never result in the efficient amount. Franke and Leininger
(2014) show - by borrowing from optimal contest theory - that biased lotteries can provide
the efficient amount of the public good. This paper aligns this result with standard public
good theory, in particular the classic notion of Lindahl pricing. It shows that biased lotteries
can - implicitly - implement Lindahl pricing of the public good in non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
There is a huge literature on the provision of public goods. Morgan (2000), however, was the
first to link the old institution of lotteries directly to the theory of the provision of public goods.
He views a lottery, part of whose proceeds go to the provision of a public good, as a voluntary
contribution scheme (and not merely a substitute for confiscatory tax schemes by the state). And,
indeed, many private charities or institutions that lack any taxing power use lotteries to generate
revenues for their respective aims.
Lotteries are a worldwide phenomenon (for an extensive study of US state lotteries see e.g.
Clotfelter and Coak, 1991) and the traditional view of them as inefficient and regressive instru-
ments for raising surrogate tax money is being challenged by Morgan’s question, whether they
rather may constitute an effective contribution scheme towards the supply of public goods.
Morgan (2000) showed that the provision of a public good can be enhanced by the use of
lotteries or - in Morgan’s terms - fixed prize raffles.The reason for this interesting result is that
the positive externality of a contribution on others in the pure voluntary provision scheme is now
counteracted to some extent by the negative externality on others of buying additional lottery
tickets (which lowers their probability of winning the contest for the fixed prize R). As a result
contributions towards financing the public good increase in comparison to voluntary contribution.
However, any prize sum of finite value is never sufficient to finance and provide the efficient
amount of the public good. In this regard Morgan’s model can be viewed as a fund-raising
model as he is not primarily interested in efficient provision of the public good.
Franke and Leininger (2014) directly address efficiency within Morgan’s model. By using
insights from optimal contest theory (Franke et al., 2013) they show that an appropriately biased
lottery together with a finite prize sum can induce the efficient amount of public good provision,
if consumers differ sufficiently in the valuation of the public good. They do so under Morgan’s
assumption that lottery prizes have to be financed completely out of lottery proceeds. This is
in marked contrast to Kolmar and Wagner (2012) and Giebe and Schweinzer (2014) who rely
on forms of coercive taxation to finance the lottery prize in order to get an efficiency result.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the intuition behind the surprising result of Franke and
Leininger (2014) within Morgan’s model by analyzing the relationship between optimally biased
lotteries and Lindahl prices. The insight from optimal contest theory is that biasing contest
success functions - here lotteries - can increase competitive pressure among the contestants -
here consumers -, which increases the amount of negative externality exerted on others through
ticket purchases. This effect further mitigates the free-riding incentive due to the public good
provision. This transmission effect is equivalently represented here as a public good pricing
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mechanism, which directly relates to classic Lindahl pricing of a public good.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce Morgan’s (2000) model and
review the results obtained for it. Section 3 reinterprets biased raffles as unbiased raffles with
individual prices for tickets and shows the main result, that the efficient provision of the public
good by means of a biased raffle leads effectively to Lindahl pricing of the public good in (non-
cooperative) equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of consumers, who each has a quasi-linear utility function of the
type
ui(wi,G) = wi + hi(G)
with wi summarizing the wealth of i and G denoting the amount of the public good provided
economy wide. It is standard to assume that h
′
i > 0 and h
′′
i < 0, i = 1, . . . , n. Wealth can be
transformed into public good by using the production function f (w) = w; i.e. one unit of (private)
wealth can be transformed into one unit of the public good. All consumers are (expected) utility
maximizers.
A social planner would like to implement the socially optimal amount of the public good
(which coincides in this quasi-linear framework with the efficient allocation); i.e. he would
choose to provide G∗ units of the public good, where G∗ maximizes
(SO) W =
∑n
i=1 ui(wi,G) −G
=
∑n
i=1(wi + hi(G)) −G.
With non-binding wealth constraints the optimal amount G∗ has to satisfy the well-known Samuelson
condition:
(SOC)
n∑
i=1
h
′
i(G
∗) = 1.
If, for simplicity, we also assume that h
′
i(0) > 1, then the public good is always desirable and
G∗ > 0 should be provided.
The following facts are well-known:
i) Voluntary contribution schemes provide less than G∗ of the public good: In such a scheme
consumers directly contribute an amount xi, i = 1, . . . , n to the provision of the public
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good. Consumer i determines his contribution by maximizing
ui
wi − xi, n∑
j=1
x j
 = wi − xi + hi
 n∑
j=1
x j
 .
As Bergstrom et al. (1986) show, this results in
∑n
j=1 x
∗
j < G
∗ in any Nash equilibrium
x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) of the contribution game.
ii) Fixed-prize raffles provide less than G∗ of the public good: Morgan (2000) showed that
the provision of the public good can be enhanced by the use of special lotteries, which he
termed fixed-prize raffles. In such a raffle a pre-announced fixed prize of value R is offered
by the prospective provider of the public good; e.g. the government or a charity institution,
and awarded to the lucky buyer of the winning lottery ticket. The prize R itself has to be
financed out of the proceeds from ticket sales S . So, if ticket sales amount to S , only the
amount S − R can be used towards financing the public good. A consumer is hence not
asked directly to contribute to the provision of the public good, but indirectly through the
purchase of lottery tickets for R (with the remaining proceeds being transformed into G,
the public good). Consumer i consequently maximizes
Eui(xi, x−i) = wi − xi + xi∑n
j=1 x j
R + hi
 n∑
j=1
x j − R
 ,
where xin∑
j=1
x j
denotes the probability of consumer i winning the price R.
This indirect voluntary provision game always has a unique Nash equilibrium (Morgan
(2000), Proposition 2). Moreover, the amount of the public good provided in this equilib-
rium always exceeds the amount provided by the voluntary contribution scheme of case i).
Note, that this means that ticket sales not only exceed R, and hence the prize R can be pro-
vided, but also that they exceed R plus the amount provided by the voluntary contribution
scheme. The positive externality in providing amounts of the public good (by privately
buying lottery tickets) onto others is now automatically combined with a negative exter-
nality onto others as this reduces their chances to win the prize R. Overall the individual
incentives to free-ride are sufficiently reduced to provide more of the public good and - at
the same time - retrieve the cost of the prize R (Morgan (2000), Theorem 1). However,
even in this situation the efficient amount of the public good cannot be implemented with
a finite prize sum; that is, efficient public good provision can only be achieved in the limit
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for a prize of infinite value which requires consequently unlimited wealth of consumers
(Morgan (2000), Theorem 2). This holds also true for more general utility functions than
the ones used by Morgan (see Duncan, 2002).
iii) Franke and Leininger (2014) consider a fixed prize raffle with biased lotteries, i.e. each
consumer’s contribution xi (via ticket purchases) is weighted by a parameter αi > 0. The
winning probability of i is then given by αi xin∑
j=1
α j x j
. Then each consumer i determines the
amount of ticket purchases xi by maximizing the expected payoff
(BR) ui(x1, . . . , xn) = wi − xi + αixi∑n
j=1 α jx j
R + hi
 n∑
j=1
x j − R
 i = 1, . . . , n.
A Nash equilibrium x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) is given by a vector of ticket purchases such that
wi − x∗i +
αix∗i∑n
j=1 α jx
∗
j
R + hi(
n∑
j=1
x∗j − R)
≥ wi − xi + αixi
αixi +
∑
j,i α jx∗j
R + hi(xi +
∑
j,i
x∗j − R) for all xi ∈ [0,wi] , i = 1, . . . , n.
Franke and Leininger (2014) demonstrate for the simple case of two consumers that there
exist weights α1 and α2 and a prize R such that in equilibrium of the biased raffle game
the efficient amount of the public good is provided. The intuition behind this result is
that the heterogeneity of consumers can be balanced to some degree through appropriately
specified weights which increases competitive pressure even further up until the efficient
amount. Hence, heterogeneity of the consumers is a necessary precondition for biased
fixed prize raffles inducing efficient public good provision.
It is the purpose of this paper to align this result with standard microeconomic theory for public
goods; in particular the notion of Lindahl equilibrium, which always yields an efficient allocation.
In a Lindahl equilibrium each utility maximizing consumer pays a per-unit price for financing
the public good equal to his marginal valuation of the good. So everyone may pay a different
price, yet total payments exactly suffice to finance the good since all consumers individually
demand the efficient amount of the public good. In the present model this means that Lindahl
prices pL = (p1L, ..., pnL) have to be such that if a consumer i maximizes
ui (wi − piL ·G,G) = wi − piL ·G + hi(G)
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he should demand G∗ units of the public good and total revenue satisfies
∑n
i=1 piL · G∗ = G∗;
i.e.
∑n
i=1 piL = 1 must hold. Hence, piL = h
′
i(G
∗), i = 1, ..., n, has to hold, which automatically
yields
∑n
i=1 piL =
∑n
i=1 h
′
i(G
∗) = 1 because of (SOC). So Lindahl prices in our model are given by
piL = h′i(G
∗) for i = 1, ..., n.
3 Biased raffles and Lindahl prices
We show in detail that a biased raffle which generates winning probabilities according to
Pri(x1, ..., xn) = αi xi∑n
j=1 α j x j
, i = 1, ..., n, is equivalent to an unbiased raffle with individual ticket
prices pi = 1αi , i = 1, ..., n. The latter implies that the raffle organizer can price-discriminate
between consumers who buy tickets. To be more precise: the problem (BR) of a consumer in
a biased indirect contribution game can be transformed into the following problem where the
equilibrium remains invariant to this transformation.
Define yi := αixi, i = 1, . . . , n. Then (BR) can be written as
(PD1) max
yi
wi − 1
αi
yi +
yi∑n
j=1 y j
R + hi
 n∑
j=1
1
α j
y j − R
 ,
and we see that the prize R is now awarded in a fair raffle with ticket price pi = 1αi for consumer
i = 1, . . . , n. Also note, that revenue from ticket sales now amounts to
∑n
i=1 piyi =
∑n
i=1
1
αi
yi; i.e.
accounting for the cost of the raffle prize leads to a supply of the public good of
∑n
i=1
1
αi
yi − R.
The equivalence of the solutions of the biased indirect contribution game defined by (BR)
and the unbiased indirect contribution game with price discrimination defined by (PD1) is now
immediate: (BR) leads to the first-order conditions
(*) − 1 +
∑
j,i α jx j
(
∑n
j=1 α jx j)2
· αi · R + h′i
 n∑
j=1
x j − R
 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n;
while (PD1) results in
− 1
αi
+
∑
j,i y j
(
∑n
j=1 y j)2
R +
1
αi
h
′
i
 n∑
j=1
1
α j
y j − R
 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
5
If we multiply the latter by αi, i = 1, . . . , n, they read
−1 +
∑
j,i y j
(
∑n
j=1 y j)2
· αi · R + h′i
 n∑
j=1
1
α j
y j − R
 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
So, if y = (y1, . . . , yn) solves the latter equations, then x = (x1, . . . , xn) =
(
1
α1
y1, . . . , 1αn yn
)
must
solve the first system (and vice versa).
Now consider a raffle organizer who can sell tickets at individual prices p = (p1, ..., pn) > 0.
Then consumer i faces the following choice problem:
(PD2) max
zi
wi − pi · zi + zi∑n
j=1 z j
R + hi
 n∑
j=1
p jz j − R
 .
The first-order condition is given by
−pi +
∑
j,i z j
(
∑n
j=1 z j)2
R + pih
′
i
 n∑
j=1
p jz j − R
 = 0
and upon dividing by pi (> 0) this reads
(**) − 1 +
∑
j,i z j
(
∑n
j=1 z j)2
R
pi
+ h
′
i
 n∑
j=1
p jz j − R
 = 0.
From this we see that the effect of imposing a ticket price pi on player i is equivalent to a revalu-
ation of the prize R to Rpi , which changes incentives of player i. Note, that as long as the provision
constraint
∑n
j=1 p jz j > R is met any additional unit of wealth of player i used for ticket purchases
increases the supply of the public good by exactly one unit.
The term
∑
j,i z j
(
∑n
j=1 z j)
2
R
pi
measures the expected marginal increase in winnings from the raffle, if
one additional unit of private wealth is spent on tickets. Hence the net payment for the provision
of an additional unit of the public good by player i is
1 −
∑
j,i z j
(
∑n
j=1 z j)2
R
pi
< 1.
So personalized ticket prices (resp. personalized prizes Ri) indirectly lead to personalized prices
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for the public good piG, i = 1, ..., n. We have
piG := 1 − (MWi) Rpi
where MWi stands for marginal winnings; in this case MWi =
∑
j,i z j
(
∑n
j=1 z j)
2 . If these (net) prices piG,
i = 1, ..., n, would equal Lindahl prices piL, i = 1, ..., n, the raffle should provide the efficient
amount of the public good, G∗, and thereby implement Lindahl prices in a non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium! Alternatively, we claim that if a raffle organizer can find prices p∗ = (p∗1, ..., p
∗
n)
such that the raffle in equilibrium provides G∗, then it must hold that
piG := 1 − (MWi) Rp∗i
= piL.
We demonstrate this in our model: suppose that
∑n
j=1 p jz j−R = G∗. Then the first-order condition
of consumer i’s choice problem reads
1 − (MWi) Rp∗i
− h′i(G∗) = 0, i = 1, ..., n.
Recall now that in our simple model with quasilinear utility functions Lindahl prices are given
by
piL = h
′
i(G
∗), i = 1, ..., n,
as consumer i exactly demands the amount G∗ of the public good in a market setting, where G∗
maximizes ui(wi − piLG,G) = wi − piLG + hi(G).
Consequently,
piG = 1 − (MW) Rp∗i
= piL
for all consumers i = 1, ..., n, which leads to the following result.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose an unbiased fixed prize raffle with price-discrimination yields the efficient
amount G∗ of the public good in equilibrium. Then the public good is effectively priced at Lindahl
prices.
Alternatively, if we consider the biased indirect contribution game with αi = 1p∗i , i = 1, ..., n, it
holds that
Corollary 3.2 The efficient provision of the public good through a biased fixed prize raffle im-
plements Lindahl pricing for the public good.
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Discriminative prices pi resp. biases αi, i = 1, ..., n, effectively individualize the lottery prize R to
R
pi
resp. αiR as can be seen from the first order conditions of (PD1) and PD2 labelled (*) and (**).
This instrument - individualized lottery prize(s) - allows the coordination of individual demands
for the public good onto a common amount G∗. We have shown that this mechanism implicitly
leads to the realization of ”Lindahl-shares” in financing the public good, if one controls for the
payoffs resulting from positive winning probabilities for these lottery prizes. One common way
to implement a kind of price-discrimination is giving discounts to multi-ticket purchases. For
more on this see Damianov (2015).
4 An Example
We now provide an example with three heterogeneous players to illustrate our framework
and demonstrate our results. We consider the following specific valuation functions in order to
solve numerically for the equilibrium: h1(G) = G1/3, h2(G) = 12G
2/3 and h3(G) = c G1/2, where
c = 2.631. Note first, that h1(G) > h2(G) if and only if G < 8, while h′1(G) > h
′
2(G) if and
only if G < 1. Hence, the relative strength with respect to valuations (or marginal valuations) of
these two players depends on the respective level of public good provision and therefore cannot
be determined a-priori.1 Secondly, for reasons of convenience the constant c in the valuation
function of the third player is parametrized such that the optimal amount of the public good is
G∗ = 4.
Private Provision. Private provision of the public good yields individual contributions of
(x1, x2, x3) = (0.192, 0.037, 1.730), which leads to inefficient underprovision of the public good:
x1 + x2 + x3 = 1.960 < 4 = G∗.
Morgan Lottery. Using a fixed prize raffle with value R, the inefficient underprovision result
of the private provision model can be ameliorated to some extent: A prize value of R = 10,
for instance, yields equilibrium investments of (x1, x2, x3) = (0.335, 1.195, 10.623) resulting in
x1 + x2 + x3 − R = 2.153 of the public good, which is an improvement in comparison to the
private provision model.2 Public good provision can be further increased by choosing higher
1In this sense our specification is more involved than the two player example in Franke and Leininger (2014),
where depending on the specification of the valuation function either h1(G) > h2(G) and h′1(G) > h
′
2(G) for all G
or vice versa, as well as the simple contest game analyzed in Franke et al. (2013), where valuations are fixed and
players can be easily ranked with respect to their strength (i.e., valuation of the prize).
2Morgan (2000) abstracts from wealth constraints in his analysis because he is rather interested in allocative
instead of distributive efficiency. Setting higher prize values in the lottery model implies that wealth constraints are
more likely to be binding under a given wealth distribution.
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prize values: A prize value of R = 50 (100) yields an amount of 3.175 (3.498) of the public
good. However, as shown in Morgan (2000), no finite prize sum will result in the optimal level
of public good provision. In other words, the Morgan lottery framework is not able to neutralize
free-riding completely such that inefficient underprovision of the public good still remains a
concern.
Biased Lottery. In a biased lottery framework, individual contributions are weighted dif-
ferently in the process of determining the lottery winner, which opens a further channel to in-
centivize players to invest into lottery tickets and therefore increase public good provision even
further. If players are heterogeneous then the bias can be designed in such a way that the play-
ing field is more leveled. This will increase competitive pressure and induce even higher con-
tributions than under the Morgan lottery. A prize value of R = 21 in combination with bias
weights (α1, α2, α3) = (1.66, 1.7, 1), for instance, yields equilibrium investments of (x1, x2, x3) =
(4.066, 5.592, 15.339), which results in the efficient amount x1 + x2 + x3−R = 3.997 ≈ G∗ = 4 of
the public good. Note, that the incentives in a biased lottery can be so strong that even inefficient
overproduction can occur; for instance, with a prize value of R = 23 and unchanged bias weights
the amount of the public good results in 4.086 > G∗. Moreover, there might be more than one
combination of biases and prize value that results in efficient public good provision; for instance,
the combination (R, α1, α2, α3) = (30, 1.55, 2.38, 1) also yields public good provision at the ef-
ficient level of 3.999 ≈ G∗.These examples suggest that bias and prize sum can substitute each
other to some degree. In the last mentioned specification, for instance, a comparatively higher
prize sum is combined with a slightly lower bias weight α2 (although α3 has to be increased
accordingly to maintain efficiency).
Lindahl Pricing. Using Lindahl prices of (p1L, p2L, p3L) = (0.132, 0.210, 0.658) each player
would be willing to demand and finance the efficient amount G∗ = 4 of the public good and the
entire cost of provision is covered because p1L + p2L + p3L = 1. Note also, that Lindahl prices help
to identify the relative ranking of players at the optimal provision point: Here, the second player
benefits more from public good provision at the efficient level than the first player because p2L =
h′2(G
∗) > p1L = h′1(G
∗). We can also replicate the established relation between Lindahl prices
and optimal weights in the biased lottery framework. From the equality piL = 1−
∑
j,i z j(∑3
j=1 z j
)2αiR we
can recover individual bias weights for the first mentioned specification as follows:
α1 =
(z1 + z2 + z3)2
z2 + z3
1 − p1L
R
=
(6.750 + 9.506 + 15.339)2
9.506 + 15.339
1 − 0.132
21
= 1.66
α2 =
(z1 + z2 + z3)2
z1 + z3
1 − p2L
R
=
(6.750 + 9.506 + 15.339)2
6.750 + 15.339
1 − 0.210
21
= 1.7
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α3 =
(z1 + z2 + z3)2
z1 + z2
1 − p3L
R
=
(6.750 + 9.506 + 15.339)2
6.750 + 9.506
1 − 0.658
21
= 1.
5 Discussion
More General Contest Success Functions. An optimally biased fixed prize raffle induces the
efficient amount of public good provision by favoring specific players and therefore increasing
competitive pressure up to the right amount. We now discuss the robustness of our result with
respect to more general contest success function (that could also include alternative ways of fa-
voritism like head starts). Consider, for instance, the following class of contest success functions:
fi(xi)∑n
j=1 f j(x j)
, where fi(xi) is non-negative, increasing and concave.3 This class contains the biased
lottery or fixed prize raffle as special case ( fi(xi) = αixi), but also other types of favoritism like
head starts ( fi(xi) = xi + δi), where players obtain an up-front lump-sum bonus of lottery tick-
ets. For simple contest games this general class of contest success functions has been analyzed
in Franke et al. (2016), section 6.1, where it is shown that within this class an appropriately
biased lottery leads to highest total contributions. In other words, competitive pressure under
the optimally biased lottery is higher in comparison to any other contest success function of
this class. This insight can also be applied to the fixed prize raffle with public good provision,
where the objective is to induce the efficient and not the maximal amount of contributions. We
therefore conjecture that any other contest success function from this class resulting in efficient
public good provision could be substituted by a biased fixed prize raffle with a comparatively
lower prize sum. In this sense the biased fixed prize raffle is the contest success function that can
induce efficient public good provision with the lowest prize sum. A proof of this conjecture goes
beyond the scope of this paper and is relegated to future research.
Risk-Neutrality and Subsidies. In our setup players have quasi-linear preferences which im-
plies risk-neutrality. Relaxing this assumption might alter our results. Duncan (2002) considers
risk-aversion in a setup with unbiased lotteries and demonstrates that, in contrast to Morgan
(2000), higher prize values do not always lead to higher public good contributions. Under risk-
aversion investments into lottery tickets become less attractive due to the stochastic nature of
the lottery. A direct implication of this analysis is that depending on the specifics of the utility
function there might exist a maximal prize value which induces an upper bound on public good
provision (which will be second-best, i.e., below the optimal amount). For the case of biased
lotteries with risk-neutral players, our previous analysis in Franke and Leininger (2014) estab-
3Concavity guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
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lished the existence of a minimal prize value which is required to induce the efficient amount of
public good provision. Combining both insights implies that in some circumstances the maximal
prize value (induced through risk-aversion) might actually be lower than the minimal prize value
(required for the optimal bias to induce efficient public good provision), which would impede ef-
ficient public good provision under risk-aversion. These circumstances will be highly dependent
on the degree of risk-aversion in combination with the degree of heterogeneity of the players; the
analysis of this complex relation goes beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, there exists a
simple variation to circumvent these complications: Implementation of a weighted sharing rule
instead of a biased lottery contest would transform the stochastic lottery into a subsidy scheme,
where the subsidy depends in a proportional way on the relative but weighted individual contri-
butions to the public good, comp. Remark 1 in Morgan (2000), without altering the structure of
our model.4 As this subsidy scheme does not involve any risk, violations of risk-neutrality would
not have the mentioned implications and our analysis would apply without further modifications.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have considered biased fixed prize raffles for efficient public good provision. In these games
contributions to the provision of a public good are elicited from consumers by offering a biased
raffle with fixed prize R. The prize R is financed out of the proceeds from raffle ticket sales
and only the surplus revenue beyond R goes towards provision of the public good. We have
shown that the equilibrium outcome can always be generated by a fair; i.e. not biased, fixed
prize raffle whose tickets are sold at different prices to different consumers; i.e. holding a biased
fixed prize raffle can be understood as holding a fair raffle with a price-discriminating ticket
seller. We then demonstrated that there is a close relation between the optimal degree of price-
discrimination for lottery tickets and Lindahl pricing of the public good in the sense that optimal
price-discrimination of lottery tickets is equivalent to setting Lindahl prices for the public good
along with offering appropriate chances for winning the prize R.
4In Morgan (2000) the total subsidy amount is set-aside from total contributions; i.e., this modified scheme is
still self-financing and satisfies budget-balance. This would not be true of a subsidy scheme that relies on additional
resources to subsidize specific consumers, comp. for instance, Thomas and Wang (2017).
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